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Abstract: There is robust experimental evidence that in the ultimatum game real
players often prefer a fair allocation which seems to be in contrast to rational de-
cision making. In this paper players can be committed to rational maximizing
behavior or to norm-guided fair behavior as two possible behavioral rules. It is
argued that behavioral rules are adopted according to their expected success before
the ultimatum game is conducted with randomly chosen players. Using the concept
of behavioral equilibrium proﬁles it is shown that conditional to the information
status the players may adopt the fair behavioral rule instead of maximizing. Fur-
thermore, conditions are derived where maximizing and fair behavior are both parts
of a behavioral equilibrium proﬁle. Also the relation to the indirect evolutionary
approach is brieﬂy discussed.
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1 Introduction: behavioral explanations in game the-
ory
The ultimatum game is considered in its basic two-person form: A player X (proposer)
has to make a proposal how to distribute a given amount of money M to both players
(δM,(1 − δ)M), δ ∈ [0,1]. The player Y (responder) can accept or reject the proposal.
In case of acceptance the players receive a payoﬀ according to the proposed allocation, in
case of rejection both players get nothing. This game has been studied in various variants,
and experiments have been conducted under diﬀerent conditions. This paper do not aim
to give an overview about the experimental results (cf. Camerer/Thaler 1995, G¨ uth 1995,
Huck 1997). One main result is that a signiﬁcant part of real players (proposer as well as
responder) seem to be intrinsically motivated to implement a fair allocation. This is in
contrast to rational behavior which predicts an allocation (M−²,²), ² → 0, since a rational
responder will prefer a small positive outcome ² to a zero payoﬀ. A rational proposer
will anticipate this behavior and maximizes his own payoﬀ by proposing the mentioned
1“unfair” allocation. In this paper, the terms rational, maximizing, and opportunistic are
used as synonyms.
The attitude to play fair or to follow other social norms deserves a theoretical explanation.
There exists a couple of concepts in the literature how to deal with these behavioral
eﬀects. One approach is to modify the utility function by adding new arguments in order
to account for unequity-aversion, reciprocity or other motivational dispositions (see e.g.
Rabin 1993, Falk/Fischbacher 1998, Bolton/Ockenfels 1999 among others). Although this
is a straightforward way to ﬁt the economic models with the observed data, it seems to be
ad hoc as long as there is no economic explanation for the suggested speciﬁc preferential
or motivational structures. It is not suﬃcient to claim that the additional factors refer to
some psychological theory. Since the logic of the model implies that agents behave kind
in some sense because they prefer kindness (in terms of utility), it is a usual neoclassical-
type explanation with exception for some additional reasoning about the utility function.
One may say that agents with social preferences are still in some sense maximizers. This
way of explanation rarely fails because preferences, attitudes, and motivation are not
directly observable states, hence every observed behavioral pattern can be “explained” by
preference functions with certain additional arguments.
A more promising concept is the indirect evolutionary approach (see G¨ uth/Kliemt 1998
and G¨ uth/Pull 2002 for an application). This approach accounts for both, opportunistic
rational behavior as well as intrinsically motivated or norm-guided behavior. The more
or less strategic deliberation of choice is combined with evolutionary adaption according
to the expected objective outcome. Agents may make decisions which seem to them
subjectively preferable even if the objective outcome is not. Of course the evolutionary
process will favor behavioral patterns with a high objective performance and rule out
others. It may turn out that opportunistic behavior is not a dominant pattern, and that
agents who follow certain social norms (captured in their utility function) may survive.
In contrast to theories with ad hoc assumptions about social preferences the indirect
evolutionary approach serves as an explanation for the evolution of preferential structures
which induce non-opportunistic behavioral patterns.
In some sense the argumentation in this paper is similar to the indirect evolutionary
approach but some shortcomings are avoided. First, there remain some methodological
doubts whether diﬀerent observable behavior can and should be explained by diﬀerent
non-observable states like preferences, motivation or attitudes which are expressed in
2terms of a modiﬁed utility function. Even if the emergence and stability of social pref-
erences have been fully explained by an evolutionary model, the actual diﬀerent (fair,
unfair) behavior of two participients in an experiment must then be explained by their
diﬀerent, but unfortunately unobservable preferences. This is not fully satisfying. Fur-
ther problems arise when the same players participate in a dictator game experiment and
exhibit signiﬁcant less fair behavior (cf. Forsythe et al. 1994). If it is reasonable to
assume that preferences are manifest and long-lasting structures, such results breed the
neccessity to construct more and more complicated utility functions and to show their
evolutionary success. Some authors refer to Becker (1976) who had outlined the idea
of evolution of (social) preferences (e.g. Huck 1997). In contrast, Becker also strongly
doubts whether behavioral diﬀerences can and should be explained by preferential diﬀer-
ences (Becker/Stigler 1977).
For an evolutionary explanation it is suﬃcient to show that behavioral patterns have a dif-
ferent performance and are hence either propagated or ruled out by the selection process.
There is no need to argue that the underlying preferences are selected, even though this
might actually be the case. Moreover, the concept of evolution of preferences implies a
strict distinction between objective outcome (as the selection criterion for the evolutionary
process) and subjective utility (which is the criterion for individual decision making). Just
this is the second shortcoming of the approach. For an evolutionary theory in a Darwinian
tradition it is neccessary to compare the diﬀerent success of behavioral patterns by an
objective measure. In a biological context this may be the reproductive power, and there
are external factors which “decide” about survival and reproduction. The individuals are
not aware whether their genotype is selected or not. In a social context the evolutionary
mechanism is often semantically interpreted as adaption, learning, or imitation (because
agents do not “die” or “reproduce” in an economic sense). The diﬀerence between out-
come and utility then seems to be at least a doubtful concept for logical reasons because a
decision making process is based on the individually perceived value of the consequences
of decisions. In contrast to the biological context, agents adopt or change a behavioral
rule, imitate other agents, learn something and adapt themselves to the environmental
conditions. It is by no means clear why these agent based processes should be driven by
objective outcomes of their decisions. Consider, for example, two agents A and B. The
behavior of A leads to a distribution of proﬁts with a high average proﬁt but also a high
varicance. Agent B´s behavior leads to a lower average proﬁt but with a far less variance.
3Now consider that both agents are risk averse. The distribution for B has a higher utility
and is prefered by both agents. Hence, it would be rational for A to imitate (or adapt to)
the behavior of B. Is A or B more “successful”? Which behavior “performs” better? The
evolutionary selection mechanism refers to the objective (expected) outcome and selects
agent A´s decision rule while B is outperformed.
In competitive markets – the predominant example to illustrate the idea of economic
evolution – the notion of “evolutionary forces” is persuasive. The survival of ﬁrms (and
their strategies) may be more or less correlated with their objective proﬁts. But also in
this competitive world it is not clear why ﬁrms with a proﬁt margin lower than average
(but eventually also with a lower variance) will be ruled out from the market. It has
to be pointed out that for many other economic problems it is far less evident to argue
with an external evolutionary pressure, e.g. consumer choice, games with non-monetary
outcomes, games where the outcome is a multidimensional vector and so on. Also in
ultimatum games it is less convincing to invoke terms like “competition”. For what
reasons should a certain behavioral rule which leads to shaes less than 50% of M but a
high level of subjective welfare be outperformed? By what external forces? The evolution
of preferences is therefore a type of explanation which may be applied very carefully in a
limited set of cases.
In this paper we use the approach of behavioral equilibria and behavioral equilibrium
proﬁles (cf. Pasche 2001). The argumentation is as follows: Rational maximizing decision
making as well as adopting other arbitrary (e.g. norm-guided) patterns of behavior are
interpreted as behavioral rules which are not a priori presumed but have to be explained.
The adoption of a rule may be interpreted as a result of an individual decision or a learning
or adaption process. Like in the indirect evolutionary approach this adoption is guided
by the (expected) success, but in terms of the agent´s own utilities.
More formally, let Si be the strategy space of agent i = 1,...,n. A behavioral rule is then







a certain strategy of player i which is in acordance with the behavioral rule fi given i´s
beliefs regarding the strategies of the other players se
−i. This decision need not be a best
response to the expected strategies, i.e. it need not maximize the utility ui(si,se
−i). Never-
theless also maximizing behavior smax
i ∈ fmax
i (se
−i) = argmaxsi ui(si,se
−i) is a special type
of a behavioral rule. In an equilibrium the expected strategy choices have to be consistent
with the realized choices so that si ∈ fi(s−i) holds true for all i = 1,...,n. We call (si,s−i)
4a behavioral equilibrium since all players choose their strategies in accordance with their
adopted behavioral dispositions and have therefore no reason to change unilaterally the
strategy. Hence, for maximizing behavior (smax
i ,smax
−i ) is the Nash equilibrium which is a
special case of an behavioral equilibrium. Since the chosen strategies depend on the rules
fi we say that an behavioral equilibrium – if it exists – is induced by the vector (f1,...,fn).
Let Ω denote the set of alternative behavioral rules, then (f1,...,fn) = (fi,f−i) is called
a behavioral equilibrium proﬁle if no player i can beneﬁt from changing unilaterally the
rule fi (comparing the payoﬀs in the induced equilibria). The adoption of a certain rule
is then explained by being part of a behavioral equilibrium proﬁle since a rule learning or
adaption process cannot lead to a better performance anymore. In disequilibrium there
is always the chance of discovering a better performing rule which may yield diﬀerent
outcomes. We apply this concept to the ultimatum game to analyse the conditions (a)
for the occurence of fairness dispositions, (b) the simultanous occurance of fair and unfair
behavior in the population.
2 The Ultimatum Game with Diﬀerent Behavioral
Rules
2.1 Assumptions
Consider a population of n players where two agents are randomly drawn to play the
ultimatum game. At the ﬁrst stage the players have to select a certain behavioral rule.
At the second stage the nature decides randomly which player is the proposer and which
one is the responder. Then the ultimatum game is conducted. The logic behind this
structure is that social norms are assumed to be manifest behavioral dispositions – at
least for a certain time. Such a behavioral disposition should be beneﬁcial in numerous
similar decision situations where the agent probably faces diﬀerent roles: Sometimes he is
the proposer (X), sometimes he is the responder (Y ). It does not make sense to say that
an agent has internalized a fairness norm but is deciding according to this norm only in
cases where he is the responder. The probability to be in position X or Y are px and py
and for simplicity it is assumed px = py = 1/2. The set Ω of behavioral rules contains
the maximizing opportunistic rule O and the fairness rule F. For simplicity the monetary
amount to allocate is normed to M = 1.
5Opportunistic rule O:
Position X: Depending on the (beliefs about the) opponent’s rule choose a proposal that
maximizes the monetary outcome for X.
Position Y : Accept every proposal with a positive share for Y , otherwise be indiﬀerent.
Fairness rule F:
Position X: Choose the proposal (1/2 + φ,1/2 − φ).
Position Y : Accept each proposal with a share for Y which is at least 1/2 − φ, otherwise
reject.
It is φ = α(1
2 − ²),α ∈ [0,1], so that α describes the degree of fairness (α = 0 leads to
equity and denotes therefore complete fairness, α = 1 leads to the same allocation like an
opportunistic player would propose, that means no fairness). The degree of fairness α is
assumed to be exogeneously given and it is Common Knowledge.
Let µ be the share of agents in the population which have adopted the opportunistic
rule, and µ is also Common Knowledge. Consider a utility function u(z) = zm with
0 < m < 1 (risk aversion) and z as the outcome. To keep notation simple let OX = u(1−²)
and OY = u(²) be the utilities of an unfair allocation, and FX = u(1/2 + φ) and
FY = u(1/2 − φ) as the utilities of the fair (of degree α) allocation.
Now the ultimatum game is conducted on the last stage according to the adopted rules.
The rules are either observable or the player have to build expectations on the opponent´s
rule. Since the beliefs should be consistent in case of unobservable rules we assume that
agents believe that the opponent follows the opportunistic rule O with probability µ,
and the fairness rule F with probability (1 − µ). Now at the ﬁrst stage it is possible
to calculate the expected utility for both rules. In an equilibrium proﬁle each player
has adopted the behavioral rule with the highest expected utility given the rules of the
other players. We do not reason about how an equilibrium proﬁle is constituted, e.g. by
strategic considerations, learning or an adaption process. Nevertheless we will say that
an player has an “incentive” to adopt a rule. This indicates that the approach follows
Rubinstein (1998, 4) since the agents deliberate in some way how they make decisions.
This deliberation is driven by subjective valuation of the outcomes.
62.2 Interactions with observable rules
First, consider a situation where the players can observe the adopted rules. It can be
argued that in cases where the player know each other well like in a family or other social
reference groups the adopted norms, attitudes or customs are Common Knowledge. We
say that an agent who faces a well known responder is interacting in a “local group”.
Otherwise we talk about “anonymous interactions” where the opponent´s rule is private
information. In a local group an opportunistic proposer will anticipate that a fair re-
sponder will reject an unfair allocation. Hence it is rational to propose the fair allocation
(FX,FY ) in case that the rational player is selected from nature to be in position X.
Therefore the expected utilities E[uO] and E[uF] of the behavioral rules O and F are








































There is an incentive to select the fair rule if





















holds true, which is always the case for 0 < m < 1. When interacting within a local
group there is always an incentive to adopt the fair rule. The incentive is higher with
a higher degree of fairness (lower α). The explanation is simple: Due to risk aversion
a fair rule guarantees a relative “smooth” payoﬀ, because also in the responder position
the agent will receive a fair share, while the opportunistic agent will get sometimes very
much and sometimes very low, if he meets an opportunistic opponent. This explanation
is not neccessarily in contrast to the assumption of moral attidues of equity, internalized
fairness norms, and empathy with other players. Moreover, these norms and attitudes
may have been evolved because it is beneﬁcial to reduce the high risk which would be the
result of a pure opportunistic population.
Since the fair rule outperforms opportunism independently from µ there is only one be-
havioral equilibrium proﬁle (F,...,F) or µ = 0 respectively. In this model it is much
harder to explain why player behave unfair rather than fair. This result is due to the
strong information assumption and seems not to be realistic.
72.3 Anonymous interactions
The responder´s rule adopted in the ﬁrst stage is considered to be private information.
Since the players are randomly drawn from the population the proposer expects that
the responder has adopted the opportunistic rule O with probability µ. Depending on
this expectation an opportunistic player has to decide whether he proposes a fair or an
unfair allocation in case of being in position X. Obviously with a high µ he will face
with a high probability a maximizing opponent, hence he will choose the unfair proposal
(OX,OY ). If µ is suﬃciently low there is a high risk that the responder is a fair player
who will reject the allocation, hence the proposer chooses (FX,FY ). In the latter case
we call the behavior “imitating” because the player behaves like a fair agent, but only for
opportunistic reasons. In the responder position, however, he will accept both, OY and
FY .
In order to calculate the expected utilities of the rules the player have to build expectations
about the share ν of opportunistic players who make unfair proposals, and (1 − ν) of
opportunistic players who imitate. Like it was argued for the expectation µ, we consider
that the expected and the realized share of unfair opportunistic players ν are the same.
The expected payoﬀs are now (uOI for imitating opportunistic agents):


























































The imitation is favored to an unfair allocation in case of






















(1 − ²)m .
8The share µ∗ is the borderline between a positive and a negative sign. For all µ < µ∗
the share of fair agents is high enough to induce an incentive to select the imitating
opportunistic rule OI instead of O. Comparing the unfair opportunistic rule with fair
behavior we have an incentive to play fair if




















(1 − ²)m + ν²m ≤ µ
∗.
Again, µ∗∗ is the borderline between a positive and a negative sign. This means that
for all µ < µ∗∗ the fair rule outperforms the unfair (non-imitating) opportunistic rule.
Because of µ∗∗ ≤ µ∗ this condition is more restrictive than the condition for imitation.







with m = 0.8,² = 0.01,ν = 1
Figure 1: Critical values µ∗ and µ∗∗ in case of anonymous interactions
At last we have to compare the imitating opportunistic rule with fair behavior. Obviously,





9holds true. This means that for ν > 0 there is never an incentive to change from oppor-
tunistic imitation to the fair rule and there is indiﬀerence in case of ν = 0.
Consider µ < µ∗. Then all opportunistic players have an incentive to imitate, that means
they adopt rule OI. Hence, it is ν = 0 for all µ < µ∗ and, conversely, ν = 1 for all µ > µ∗.
In case of ν = 0, however, we have µ∗∗ = µ∗ which implies that there is indiﬀerence
between OI and F. Therefore we obtain two types of behavioral equilibrium proﬁles:
• The proﬁle (O,...,O) or resp. µ = 1 where all allocations are unfair,
• A continuum of proﬁles containing OI and F with µ < µ∗ = µ∗∗ (we neglect the
special case of indiﬀerence µ = µ∗).













which is the maximum share of opportunistic (imitating) players in a mixed behavioral
equilibrium proﬁle. Since in a mixed equilibrium proﬁle all opportunistic players imitate
we will never observe unfair allocations. This is unrealistic. The main diﬀerence to the
case of complete information (local group) is that the advantage of playing fair or to
imitate is not (only) due to risk aversion.
2.4 Interactions with partially observable rules
No real individual interacts the whole life exclusively with anonymous agents or exclu-
sively within a well-known local group. If an internalized social norm or a manifest
attitude should make sense it has to perform well in a world where sometimes anonymous
interactions and somtimes interactions in a local group occur. Depending on personal and
social circumstances the frequency of local and anonymous interactions diﬀers from agent
to agent. Let qi (0 < qi < 1) be the probability for player i to interact with a member of
a local group, and hence, (1 − qi) is the probability that the randomly chosen opponent
10is anonymous. We calculate the expected utilities of all rules in the same way as above:
E[uO] = qi [px(µXO + (1 − µ)XF) + (1 − px)(µY O + (1 − µ)Y F)]+


















































E[u(OI] = qi [px(µXO + (1 − µ)XF) + (1 − px)(µY O + (1 − µ)Y F)]+




























































E[uF] = qi [pxXF + (1 − px)Y F]+
















































Since qi is a speciﬁc parameter for each player, the incentives to imitate or to play fair
are individually diﬀerent. For an opportunistic player there is an incentive to imitate if






















(1 − ²)m .
Again, µ∗ is the borderline between a positive and a negative sign of the expression. The
incentive to adopt F instead of O is given in case of
E[uF] − E[uO] =
1
2









































¢m + (1 − ²)m + (1 − qi)ν²m.
11Because the critical value µ∗∗ depends on the individual parameter qi we write µ∗∗(qi).
Finally, the incentive to change from opportunistic imitation to rule F is given if














































In case of ν = 0 and qi > q∗
i = 0 all players have an incentive to adopt the rule F.
Therefore, with µ < µ∗ the share of unfair opportunistic players is ν = 0 and there is
an incentive to adopt rule F. This implies µ = 0 and a monomorphic population of fair






... qi = 0
... qi = 0.5
µ∗∗
i with ...
... qi = 0.7
.. qi = 0.6
Figure 2: Critical values µ∗ and µ∗∗(qi) for mixed interactions
If µ > µ∗ there is no incentive for an opportunist to imitate and hence ν = 1. It depends on
qi whether it is µ < µ∗∗(qi) or µ > µ∗∗(qi). Figure 2 depitcs µ∗ and µ∗∗(qi) with alternative
values for qi. For very small values of qi it is µ∗∗(qi) < µ∗ for all α. This is the case of
12(almost) complete anonymous interaction. Obviously for all µ with µ∗∗(qi) < µ < µ∗
there is ν = 0 so that all µ∗∗(qi)-graphs which are paratemrized with ν = 1 are relevant
only in the region above µ∗. In this parameter region we have two cases:
• If µ∗ < µ < µ∗∗(qi) then rule O outperforms OI but rule F outperforms O. Hence,
player i would adopt F.
• If µ∗ < µ∗∗(qi) < µ then rule O outperformas OI and F. Player i would adopt the








i (qi) with α = 0,ν = 1
Figure 3: The border between choosing F and O
In contrast to the case of purely anonymous interactions we have for all fairness degrees
α a set of mixed behavioral equilibrium proﬁles containing O and F with µ > µ∗ and
with µ > µ∗∗(qi) for all opportunistic players i and µ < µ∗∗(qj) for all fair player. With
a given α there is a nonlinear relationship between qi and µ∗∗(qi). For α = 0 and ν = 1
the graph is depicted in ﬁgure 3. The branch in the range [0,qc
i] has no meaning since for
these (µ,qi)-combinations it is ν = 0. For all µ > µ∗ it can be seen that the higher the
13frequency of interaction in a local group the more likely it is to be on the right side of
the graph, i.e. to adopt the fair rule F. For socially less integrated individuals who are
not often interacting with well-known “trustworthy” people (qi is low) it is more likely
to adopt the unfair opportunistic rule O. In mixed behavioral equilibrium proﬁles in the
model with local and anonymous interactions the minimum share of unfair players in case




Using the concept of behavioral equilibrium proﬁles which accounts for rational strategic
behavior as well as for heuristic or norm-guided behavior we have analysed the ultimatum
game with two possible behavioral rules. Depending on the information status regarding
the rules which reﬂects the (absence of) familiarity between players we found the following
results:
• In case of observable rules (interaction within a local group) there is a unique
monomorphic behavioral equilibrium proﬁle with µ = 0 (only F). This is not
compatible with the experimental results.
• In case of purely anonymous interactions we have one monomorphic equilibrium
proﬁle with µ = 1 (only O) and a continuum of equilibrium proﬁles containing OI
and F with µ < µ∗. Since there are no behavioral diﬀerences to observe in such a
proﬁle (only fair allocations), this is an unrealistic case.
• If the adoption of behavioral rules depends on interactions within a local group
and with anonymous agents, the analysis leads to complete diﬀerent results. There
exists one monomorphic behavioral equiliobrium proﬁle with µ = 0 (only F) and a
continuum of equilibrium proﬁles containing F and O with µ > µ∗, depending on
the distribution of the qi.
It has to be remarked that the assumed rules are rather simple. It is possible to introduce
other fairness rules (e.g. where the degrees of proposed and accepted deviations from equal
split diﬀer) or to enlarge the set Ω of possible rules. Furthermore it will be interesting
to model an endogenous determination of the degree of fairness α. This may shed some
light on the problem how equity norms emerge in a purely opportunistic population (if
14this is seen as a plausible “primitive state” of a population). Starting with a low degree
of fairness (α → 1) the critical values µ∗ and µ∗∗ are very high. Therefore a very small
subpopulation of fair agents can invade and trigger the evolution of higher degrees of
fairness and the increasing adoption of rule F. The analysis may also be applied to
variants of the game like the three-person-ultimatum game (cf. G¨ uth/van Damme 1998)
or the dictatorship-game.
The crucial point of the paper is the explanation why agents adopt certain behavioral
rules. It was argued that each proﬁle of rules determines a (in this case: unique) behav-
ioral equilibrium, and that a proﬁle itself constitutes an equilibrium when no player can
beneﬁt from adopting another rule. It does not play a role whether the adoption comes
from strategic deliberation or from adaptive processes. As we talk about “incentives” to
adopt a certain rule, it might be irritating at the ﬁrst sight that a behavioral equilibrium
proﬁle implies some kind of maximization calculus over the set of rules Ω. Lipman (1991)
addresses the question whether this kind of recursion runs into logical problems, and he
denies the question. Moreover, Rubinstein (1998) claims that there is a need for theories
of boundedly rational behavior which consider that agents reason about how they decide.
The calcules of selecting the best performing rule requires a closed and well-deﬁned set
Ω. It has to be underlined that for analytical reasons this set of rules is taken as exoge-
neously given. In fact, behavioral rules are not given data for the agents, but they are
created by them. However, incorporating endogeneous creation of new patterns would be
a non-accomplishable task of a formal theory.
It is obvious that rational maximizing behavior turns out not to be the (unique) best per-
forming rule as it was often claimed to justify neo-classical assumptions as the result of
evolutionary selection (cf. Alchian 1950, Friedman 1953). The concept bridges the gap be-
tween rational choice and behavioral explanations in economics. On the one hand, rational
maximizing behavior as well as behavioral approaches of decision making are explained
(not presumed) within an integrated framework. On the other hand, psychological and
other aspects are incorporated in well-deﬁned behavioral rules and the analysis of equilib-
rium proﬁles is a rigorous (utility based) concept which leads to clear formal propositions
– this may be a charming invitation for neo-classical theory to abandon its apriorism.
How is this approach related to other explanations of fairness, especially to the indirect
evolutionary approach? First of all, there are no cosiderations about special preference
structures and utility functions. It is claimed that sophistication of utility functions
15might be a possible but not always promising way. Since the explanandum is completely
unobservable one can reply to the objection of an ad hoc assumption only if preferences
itself are explained like in the indirect evolutionary approach. As it has been discussed
above, the latter exhibits the problem that is is doubtful to separate individual valuation
and the objective outcome which drives the selection process in the proposed way. It was
argued that an individual adaption or learning process can directly address the behavioral
rules instead of the preferences. This has also the advantage that heuristic processes of
reasoning and decision making are permitted like it is suggested in the bounded rationality
literature. For each appointed context the behavioral rules require a detailed hypothesis
which is conform to the observed results. In this paper, instead, we have taken just a
very simple case of a fairness rule in order to demonstrate how the behavioral equilibrium
concept can be applied to the ultimatum game.
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